Internet-Draft A "permanent" Design Group for TLS October 2024
Salz Expires 25 April 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
tls
Internet-Draft:
draft-rsalz-tls-analysis-latest
Published:
Intended Status:
Best Current Practice
Expires:
Author:
R. Salz
Akamai Technologies

A "permanent" Design Group for TLS

Abstract

This memo defines a permanent design team, as defned in [WGPROCS], for the TLS Working Group. The team is, repeatedly, chartered to decide whether or not a draft that has been adopted by the Working Group needs some kind of analysis in order to determine if the security guarantees promised for TLS 1.3 are still being met.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-rsalz-tls-analysis/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/richsalz/draft-rsalz-tls-analysis.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 25 April 2025.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

This memo defines a permanent design team, as defned in [WGPROCS], for the TLS Working Group (WG). The team is, repeatedly, chartered to decide whether or not a draft that has been adopted by the Working Group needs some kind of analysis in order to determine if the security guarantees promised for TLS 1.3 are still being met.

This memo defines procedures for how the TLS Working Group will operate. As such, final publication as an RFC is not required. Rather, passage through Working Group Last Call (WGLC) is all that is required to ensure WG consensus. When circumstances change, the WG Chairs may determine that another WGLC consensus call is needed.

1.1. Terminology

Although this document is not an IETF Standards Track publication, it adopts the conventions for normative language to provide clarity of instructions to the implementer. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

2. Background

TLS 1.3 benefited greatly from collaboration with many notable cryptographers during it's development. Unfortunately, [RFC8446] does not have an explicit acknowledgements section. In February of 2016, the "TLS 1.3 Ready or Not" [TRON] (TRON) workshop was held, co-located with the Network and Distributed system Security [NDSS] Symposium held in San Diego, California. The first half of the workshop had several papers analyzing the TLS 1.3 protocol, using formal method tools such as Tamarin ([TAMARIN]), ProVerif (([PROVERIF]) and classic paper proofs.

Multiple WG consensus calls over the past 18 months or so, have confirmed that the working group would like to see more formal analysis of new drafts, to ensure that they do not weaken the guarantees that are claimed in [RFC8336] and proven in the TRON presentations and subsequent other analyses.

Anecdotally, it has been relayed to the WG that some of the cryptographers who would be most relevant to future analysis do not wish to participate in the day-to-day operations of the working group. This has been variously presented as a distraction from their "real work," and also that the tenor of the communications has been seen as hostile and unwelcoming.

3. Analysis-Needed Design Group (ANDG)

This document proposes that a Design Team, as defined in Section 6.5 of [WGPROCS] and [IESGNOTE], be created. Unlike other design groups, which are formed to address issues of a specific WG document, the ANDG will determine, for each document presented to it, if some type of formal analysis is needed to verify that the security properties of TLS 1.3 still apply.

For example, adding new types entries into the SSLKEYLOGFILE [SSLKEYLOGFILE] format would likely affect the operational security of the application using them, it would have no effect on the security properties of the TLS 1.3 protocol itself. On the other hand, since a key part of the existing TLS 1.3 analyses centered around the key derivation state machine, a document that modified that would likely need analysis to show that the existing invariants still hold.

3.1. Engagement with ANDG

At various points in the lifecycle of a WG document -- adoption, development, WGLC -- the ANDG would be engaged. The actual points in the process are left to the discretion of the WG Chairs, confirmed by WG rough consensus if necessary.

Once engaged, the ANDG will decide amongst themselves a contact point for the WG Chairs, membership, and document authors. Any communication from the contact point MUST represent the consensus, if not full agreement of all involved ANDG participants.

Note that it is not a requirement that the full ANDG participate in all document reviews. To avoid confusion, the contact point SHOULD identify those participating each time the contact conveys the ANDG recommendations to the WG.

3.2. ANDG Membership

The current membership of the ANDG must always be available to the WG members, as well as any outside observers. This memo recommends that an "Additional resources" link be created on the DataTracker TLS "about" page, with a link to the document. The document should be under change control, either as a new Directorate maintained by the DataTracker, or a simple text file with names and affiliations maintained in the TLS WG GitHub repository.

Initial membership in the ANDG will be determined by the WG Chairs. ANDG members can leave at any time by emailing "tls-chairs@ietf.org", or its equivalent, and letting the Chairs know.

Anyone may propose new members to the ANDG by submitting their name to the "tls@ietf.org" mailing list. After the Chairs have determined there are no strong objections, the person is added.

Every member of the ANDG MUST to have a DataTracker account and profile. They MAY subscribe to the TLS WG mailing list if they desire.

3.3. ANDG Impact on the WG

As defined in [WGPROCS], a Design Group has no special authority over the WG decisions. If the ANDG says that analysis is needed, and no volunteers can be found, or if the WG disagrees, the document proceeds through its normal course of develpment. When or if mentioned in a Shepherd's write-up, the Document Shepherd MAY point out that the ANDG suggested analysis.

4. Relationship to UFMRG

In general, the IETF Community is also increasingly interested in formal methods to verify its protocols and data structures. The Internet Research Steering Group [IRSG] (IRSG) recently created Usable Formal Methods Research Group [UFMRG] (UFMRG) to look at how the IETF can leverage formal methods to improve the documents it generates.

This document proposes that there SHOULD be a natural collaboration, albeit not a formal one, between UFMRG and ANDG.

5. References

5.1. Normative References

[IESGNOTE]
"One Design Teams", .
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8336]
Nottingham, M. and E. Nygren, "The ORIGIN HTTP/2 Frame", RFC 8336, DOI 10.17487/RFC8336, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8336>.
[WGPROCS]
Bradner, S., "IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures", BCP 25, RFC 2418, DOI 10.17487/RFC2418, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2418>.

5.2. Informative References

[IRSG]
"Internet Research Steering Group", n.d., <https://www.irtf.org/irsg.html>.
[NDSS]
"About the Symposium", n.d., <https://www.ndss-symposium.org/about>.
[PROVERIF]
"ProVerif: Cryptographic protocol verifier in the formal model", n.d., <https://bblanche.gitlabpages.inria.fr/proverif/>.
[RFC8446]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
[SSLKEYLOGFILE]
"The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format for TLS", n.d., <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile/>.
[TAMARIN]
"Tamarin Prover", n.d., <https://tamarin-prover.com>.
[TRON]
"TLS 1.3 Ready or Not", , <https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss2016/tron-workshop-programme/>.
[UFMRG]
"Usable Formal Methods Research Group", n.d., <https://datatracker.ietf.org/rg/ufmrg/about/>.

Author's Address

Rich Salz
Akamai Technologies